We propose a construction method of secret sharing schemes realizing general access structures. Our proposed construction method is a perfect secret sharing scheme and includes Shamir's (k, n)-threshold schemes as a special case. Furthermore, for any access structure, the proposed construction method is more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme [3] and Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme I [5] .
Introduction
In Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme [1] , every k participants can recover the secret K, but no group of less than k participants can get any information about the secret from their shares. The collection of all authorized subsets is called the access structure. A (k, n)-threshold scheme can only realize particular access structures that contain all subsets of k or more participants.
Secret sharing schemes realizing more general access structures than that of a threshold scheme were studied by numerous authors [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Benaloh and Leichter proposed a scheme based on a monotonecircuit [3] . Their scheme can realize an arbitrary access structure by assigning one or more shares to each participant based on authorized subsets. When the size of the access structure is very large, the number of shares distributed to each participant is also very large in Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. A secret sharing scheme which is always more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme was proposed [5] .
In this paper, we propose a new construction method of secret sharing schemes realizing general access structures, which is perfect and can reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant. The proposed construction method is more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme [3] and Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme I [5] from the viewpoint of the number of shares distributed to each participant. The technique of the proposed construction method can be applied to Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme II [5] .
Preliminaries

Secret Sharing Scheme
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. Let D( / ∈ P) denote a dealer who selects a secret and distribute a share to each participant. Let K and S denote a secret set and a share set, respectively. The access structure Γ(⊂ 2 P ) is the family of subsets of P which contains the sets of participants qualified to recover the secret. For any authorized subset A ∈ Γ, any superset of A is also an authorized subset. Hence, the access structure should satisfy the monotone property:
Let Γ 0 be a family of the minimal sets in Γ, called the minimal access structure. Γ 0 is denoted by
For any access structure Γ, there is a family of setsΓ = 2 P − Γ.Γ contains the sets of participants unqualified to recover the secret. The family of maximal sets inΓ is denoted byΓ 1 . That is,
Let p K be a probability distribution on K. Let p S(A) be a probability distribution on the shares S(A) given to a subset A ⊂ P. Usually a secret K is chosen from K with the uniform distribution. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if
where H(K) and H(K|A) denote the entropy of p K and the conditional entropy defined by the joint probability distribution p K×S(A) , respectively. It is known that Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is perfect [8] .
Secret Sharing Schemes Based on Authorized Subsets
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, Benaloh and Leichter's scheme is described as follows [3] .
2. One distinct share from
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme I [5] is described as follows.
1. Let Γ 0− = {A ∈ Γ 0 : |A| ≤ l}, where l = max B∈Γ |B| and represent it as
2. Let P = {P ∈ X : X ∈ Γ 0 and |X| > l} and n = |P |. Compute n shares
for the secret K by using Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme. Then, one distinct share in S is assigned to each P ∈ P .
For every
Example 1: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, consider the following access structure
where
First, we consider Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. In this case, shares are distributed as follows: 
where s 6+i,j is computed by using Shamir's (
In this case, shares are distributed as follows: 
Proposed Construction Method
Here, we describe a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures.
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, the proposed construction method is described as follows:
2. Divide Γ 0− into disjoint subsets
3. Let P = {P ∈ X : X ∈ Γ 0 and |X| > l} and n = |P |. Compute n shares
For every
A i ∈ Γ (0) 0− , compute |A i | shares S i = {s n +i,1 , s n +i,2 , · · · , s n +i,|A i | } by using Shamir's (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. One distinct share in S i is assigned to each P ∈ A i (1 ≤ i ≤ d).
Z i , compute |Z i | + 1 shares S i = {s n +d+i,1 , s n +d+i,2 , · · · , s n +d+i,|Zi|+1 } by using Shamir's (|Z i | + 1, |Z i | + 1)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. One distinct share in S i − {s n +d+i,|Zi|+1 } is assigned to each P ∈ Z i (1 ≤ i ≤ r).
Y i , if r ≥ 2, compute e i shares S i = {s n +d+i,|Z i |+1,1 , · · · , s n +d+i,|Z i |+1,|Y i | } by using Shamir's (e i , |Y i |)-threshold scheme with s n +d+i,|Z i |+1 as a secret independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. One distinct share in S i is assigned to each P ∈ Y i (1 ≤ i ≤ r). If e i = 1, then s n +d+i,|Zi|+1 is assigned to all P ∈ Y i (1 ≤ i ≤ r).
Example 2:
We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by the proposed construction method.
• Divide Γ 0− into disjoint subsets
In this case,
• Since l = 3 and |P | = |P| = 6, compute 6 shares
for the secret K by using Shamir's (4, 6)-threshold scheme.
• For A 1 ∈ Γ (0) 0− , compute 2(= |A 1 |) shares S 1 = {s 7,1 , s 7,2 } by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme with K as a secret.
• For Z 1 , compute 3(= |Z 1 | + 1) shares
by using Shamir's (3, 3)-threshold scheme with K as a secret.
• Since e 1 = 1, we do not have to generate shares for the secret s 8, 3 .
• In this case, shares are distributed as follows: Here, we show some properties of the proposed construction method.
Theorem 1 For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } and any access structure Γ(⊂ 2 P ), distribute shares for a secret K by using the proposed construction method. Then, for any subset X ⊂ P,
Proof:
Let X S denote the shares in S assigned to X ⊂ P. Similarly, let X Si , X S j and X S k denote the shares in S i assigned to X (1 ≤ i ≤ d) , the shares in S j assigned to X (1 ≤ j ≤ r) and the shares in S k assigned to X (1 ≤ k ≤ r) , respectively. At first, we show H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ. (Case i) X ∈ Γ and |X| ≥ l + 1: In this case,
Since s 1 , · · · , s n are shares computed by Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme with K as a secret, we immediately obtain
(1)
Since s n +i,1 , · · · , s n +i,|Ai| are shares computed by Shamir's (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme with K as a secret, we immediately obtain
Since s n +d+i,1 , · · · , s n +d+i,|Zi|+1 are shares computed by Shamir's (|Z i | + 1, |Z i | + 1)-threshold scheme with K as a secret and s n +d+i,|Z i |+1,1 , · · · , s n +d+i,|Z i |+1,|Y i | are shares computed by Shamir's (e i , |Y i |)-threshold scheme with s n +d+i,|Zi|+1 as a secret, we obtain
Since H(K|X) ≥ 0 is obvious, we have H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ.
Next we show H(K|X) = H(K) for any X ∈ Γ. For any X ∈Γ, we have |X| ≤ l. This implies
From the property of the access structure and the definition of Γ
This implies
Similarly, from the definition of Γ
Thus, we have
H(K|X S i , X S i ) = H(K).
This also implies
H(X S i , X S i |K) = H(X S i , X S i ).(6)
In order to show H(K|X) = H(K), we expand H(K|X) as follows:
From the chain rule for entropy and the definition of
The last equality comes from (5) and (6) . On the other hand, we have
Substituting (4), (8) and (9) into (7), we obtain
The next theorem shows that the proposed construction method includes Shamir's (k, n)-threshold schemes as a special case. 
Proof:
In this access structure, we have l = k − 1, n = n and Γ 0− = φ. Then, S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } is obtained by using Shamir's (l+1, n )-threshold scheme, and one distinct share in S is assigned to each P ∈ P. Thus, the proposed construction method coincides with Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme.
(Q.E.D)
Let N A (P ) be the number of shares distributed to P ∈ P by using the proposed construction method. Similarly, let N BL (P ) and N T U M 1 (P ) be the number of shares distributed to P ∈ P by using Benaloh and Leichter's scheme and Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme, respectively. The next theorem shows the proposed construction method is the most efficient of the three from the viewpoint of the number of shares distributed to each participant.
Theorem 3 For any P ∈ P, the number of shares distributed to P is evaluated as follows:
where |x| + = max{0, x}.
Proof: N BL (P ) is obtained by N BL (P ) = |{X ∈ Γ 0 : P ∈ X}|.
Since Tochikubo, Uyematsu and Matsumoto's scheme I does not need to generate shares corresponding to X ∈ Γ 0 such that |X| > l and needs one additional share for P ∈ {P ∈ X : X ∈ Γ 0 and |X| > l} (= P ), we have N T U M 1 (P ) = |{X ∈ Γ 0− : P ∈ X}| + 1 (if P ∈ P ) |{X ∈ Γ 0− : P ∈ X}| (if P / ∈ P ) for any P ∈ P.
On the other hand, Γ 0− is divided into disjoint subsets Γ 
Conclusion
We have proposed a construction method of secret sharing schemes realizing general access structures. Our proposed construction method is a perfect secret sharing scheme and includes Shamir's (k, n)-threshold schemes as a special case. Furthermore, for any access structure, the proposed construction method is more efficient than the previous results [3, 5] .
